Open Letter to the Minnesota Supreme Court
Re: Case File No. 66-CV-22-2022, Hearing Scheduled May 5, 2025
Dear Honorable Justices of the Minnesota Supreme Court,
I am Lieutenant Commander Phillip C. Parrish, U.S. Navy (Retired), a candidate for Governor of Minnesota in 2026, with over 21 years of experience in counterterrorism and foreign policy. My career has equipped me with deep expertise in identifying and mitigating security vulnerabilities, particularly in high-stakes systems critical to national and public interest. I write to you today regarding Benda for Common-sense v. Anderson (File No. 66-CV-22-2022), a case that raises profound concerns about the integrity of Minnesota’s election systems, specifically the vulnerabilities posed by electronic voting systems (EVS) and their lack of robust chain of custody protocols. As a candidate and a citizen committed to safeguarding democratic processes, I respectfully urge the Court to consider the substantive issues at stake, informed by my firsthand knowledge and the broader evidence of election system vulnerabilities.
My Experience and Perspective
Throughout my 21-year career, I served in roles that demanded rigorous assessment of threats to national security, including cyber threats and foreign interference. I have witnessed firsthand the capabilities of adversaries to exploit digital systems, particularly those with unsecured or poorly managed access points. My experience includes direct knowledge of how digital connections, such as modems in election equipment, can be manipulated to alter outcomes, bypass chain of custody safeguards, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. These vulnerabilities are not theoretical; they are real, exploitable, and pose an existential threat to the integrity of our elections.
As a candidate for Governor, I am acutely aware of the public’s demand for transparent, secure, and trustworthy elections. The concerns raised in this case—particularly regarding Rice County’s use of EVS with embedded, potentially uncertified wireless modems—mirror the risks I have observed in my professional capacity. These issues threaten not only the outcome of specific elections but also the public’s confidence in our democratic process, a cornerstone of Minnesota’s governance.
Substantive Concerns in Case File No. 66-CV-22-2022
The appellants in this case, Benda for Common-sense and Kathleen Hagen, allege that Rice County’s EVS contained hardware, software, or features (specifically wireless modems) that were not properly approved, certified, or secure, as required by Minnesota law. They further express concern that the county’s handling of election data, including potential destruction of records, violates the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) and compromises chain of custody. My expertise and the available evidence substantiate these concerns, particularly the vulnerabilities associated with digital connections and inadequate chain of custody protocols.
1. Vulnerabilities of Digital Connections in Election Equipment
Election machines equipped with digital connections, such as wireless modems, are inherently vulnerable to hacking and manipulation. My firsthand experience confirms that any digital connection, especially those that circumvent chain of custody protocols, can be exploited to alter election results. This is not speculative; it is a fact supported by extensive research and documented incidents:
• Hacking Risks: A 2018 New York Times investigation revealed that a voting machine in Venango County, Pennsylvania, contained remote-access software, allowing external control without physical access, breaking chain of custody (New York Times, February 21, 2018). Similarly, a 2020 NBC News report found nearly three dozen U.S. voting systems connected to the internet, contradicting claims of isolation (NBC News, January 10, 2020). These findings align with my knowledge that modems, even if disabled, can be reactivated remotely, enabling unauthorized access.
• Documented Exploits: The 2005 Hursti Hack demonstrated that votes could be altered in a single step, manipulating both tabulator results and machine tapes (Forbes, April 16, 2020). At the 2018 DEF CON conference, hackers, including children, exposed vulnerabilities in voting machines, showing that digital connections are easily exploitable (The Guardian, August 22, 2018). A 2022 CISA advisory identified software vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems’ equipment used in 16 states, further underscoring the risk (AP News, June 1, 2022).
• Minnesota Context: The appellants’ claim that Rice County’s EVS contained uncertified wireless modems echoes findings in other jurisdictions. For example, the Voter Integrity Project discovered modem chips in ES&S 200 machines in North Carolina, contradicting assurances of non-connectivity (Voter Integrity Project, March 26, 2021). If Rice County’s systems are similarly equipped, they pose a direct threat to election integrity, as digital connections enable remote manipulation without detection.
These vulnerabilities are particularly alarming given the potential for foreign interference, a concern I have addressed throughout my career. A 2024 POLITICO report highlighted security bugs in New Hampshire’s voter database linked to Russian servers, illustrating the national security implications of unsecured election systems (POLITICO, September 1, 2024). Minnesota must not ignore these risks.
2. Chain of Custody Vulnerabilities
Chain of custody protocols are essential to ensure that election materials—ballots, data, and results—remain secure and unaltered from casting to certification. Digital connections, such as modems, fundamentally undermine these protocols by allowing remote access without physical oversight. My experience confirms that any system permitting external access breaks the chain of custody, rendering results untrustworthy. The appellants’ concerns about Rice County’s EVS and data handling practices highlight this issue:
• Bypassing Physical Controls: A report from SGT Report noted that cellular modems in ES&S machines in Broward County, Florida, eliminated secure chain of custody, as results could be transmitted or altered remotely (SGT Report, May 10, 2021). Emily Levy of AUDIT-USA stated, “A vulnerability like this means we can’t trust the official election results produced by those voting systems.” This directly supports the appellants’ allegations that Rice County’s EVS may lack adequate safeguards.
• Data Destruction Concerns: The appellants’ fear that Rice County intends to destroy election data subject to MGDPA requests raises further chain of custody issues. Premature destruction of records, especially those related to modem-equipped systems, could obscure evidence of tampering or misconfiguration, preventing audits or recounts from verifying results. My experience in counterterrorism emphasizes the importance of preserving evidence to trace and mitigate security breaches.
• Minnesota’s Legal Framework: Minnesota law requires strict chain of custody to ensure election integrity (Minn. Stat. § 204B.44). If Rice County’s EVS includes uncertified modems or lacks transparent protocols for data transmission, it violates these standards, as alleged by the appellants. The Court must scrutinize whether the county’s practices meet statutory requirements to protect the electoral process.
3. Public Trust and Democratic Integrity
The presence of vulnerable EVS and inadequate chain of custody protocols erodes public trust, a critical issue in Minnesota’s polarized political climate. My experience in foreign policy has shown that adversaries exploit distrust to destabilize democracies, and unsecured election systems provide fertile ground for such tactics. The appellants’ concerns about Rice County’s EVS resonate with broader public skepticism:
• Fueling Distrust: A 2022 POLITICO article noted that modems in voting machines are not only hacking targets but also tools for “information operations” to discredit elections (POLITICO, October 14, 2022). Even without confirmed hacks, the perception of vulnerability—amplified by cases like this—undermines confidence in election outcomes.
• Minnesota’s Stake: As a candidate, I hear Minnesotans demand transparency and security in elections. The appellants’ allegations, if unaddressed, risk further eroding trust, particularly if the Court dismisses the case on procedural grounds without examining the substantive issues. The public deserves assurance that election systems are secure and compliant with state law.
Recommendations to the Court
In light of the evidence and my expertise, I respectfully urge the Court to consider the following in its May 5, 2025, hearing:
1. Address Substantive Issues: While the lower courts dismissed the case on procedural grounds (e.g., improper defendant under MGDPA, lack of jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44), the Supreme Court has an opportunity to examine the substantive allegations regarding EVS vulnerabilities and chain of custody. These issues are too critical to be sidelined by technicalities.
2. Scrutinize Rice County’s EVS: Order an independent audit of Rice County’s EVS to verify whether modems are present, certified, and secure. This aligns with Minn. Stat. § 204B.44’s mandate to correct errors and omissions in election procedures.
3. Protect Election Data: Enforce MGDPA compliance to prevent the destruction of election data, ensuring transparency and auditability. This addresses the appellants’ concerns and upholds chain of custody.
4. Set a Precedent for Security: Use this case to establish clear guidelines for EVS security in Minnesota, discouraging the use of wireless modems and mandating robust chain of custody protocols. This would align with recommendations from the National Election Defense Coalition and cybersecurity experts (National Election Defense Coalition, accessed 2023).
5. Consider Broader Implications: Recognize the national security and public trust implications of unsecured election systems. Minnesota’s actions can set a model for other states grappling with similar vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
As a retired naval officer and gubernatorial candidate, I have dedicated my career to protecting our nation and its democratic institutions. The concerns raised in Benda for Common-sense v. Anderson are not abstract; they reflect real, exploitable vulnerabilities that I have witnessed firsthand. Digital connections in election machines, particularly those bypassing chain of custody, threaten the integrity of Minnesota’s elections and the trust of its citizens. I implore the Court to give these issues the weight they deserve, ensuring that our electoral process is secure, transparent, and worthy of Minnesotans’ confidence.
Thank you for your service to justice and for considering this critical matter. I stand ready to provide further insights or testimony as needed.
Respectfully,
Phillip C. Parrish
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Candidate for Governor of Minnesota, 2026
Contact Information: [email protected]
Citations:
• New York Times, “The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine,” February 21, 2018.
• NBC News, “Online and Vulnerable,” January 10, 2020.
• Forbes, “HBO Documentary Shows the Value of Cybersecurity,” April 16, 2020.
• The Guardian, “Kids at Hacking Conference,” August 22, 2018.
• AP News, “Cyber Agency: Voting Software Vulnerable,” June 1, 2022.
• POLITICO, “The National Security Threats in US Election Software,” September 1, 2024.
• SGT Report, “Update: When Cellular Modems Are Found,” May 10, 2021.
• POLITICO, “Wireless Modems Could Endanger Midterms,” October 14, 2022.
• Voter Integrity Project, “Modems Hidden in Machines,” March 26, 2021.